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ARGUMENT 
I. DESIGNSCAPE DID NOT FAIL TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, 
AS NO EVIDENCE WAS TAKEN BELOW, NO FINDINGS OF FACT 
WERE ENTERED OR FILED BY THE COURT, AND THE 
ARGUMENTS OF DESIGNSCAPE ARE NOT BASED ON ANY 
EVIDENTIARY BASIS, ONLY THE LAW. 
Bonneville Billing and Collections ("Bonneville") correctly cites to Estate of 
Bartell, 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989), for the proposition that marshaling of the evidence 
is required in cases where an Appellant relies on evidence and/or findings of fact entered 
in a case. In this instance, however, DesignScape does not in any way refer to or challenge 
evidence or findings of fact, because DesignScape's arguments are solely predicated upon 
law. Moreover, there was no evidence taken or findings of fact entered or filed below by 
the district court. Accordingly, Bonneville's failure to marshal evidence argument is 
mistaken and without merit. 
H. JUDGE'S RULE 60(b) RULING TO IMPOSE ATTORNEYS'S FEES 
AS A CONDITION TO SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT WAS 
INCONGRUENT WITH FINAL RULING THAT ATTORNEY'S 
FEES WERE NOT APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE. 
As previously argued, the District Court accepted DesignScape's justification for 
relief under Rule 60(b)(1), yet imposed $1,250 in attorneys fees for Bonneville's benefit as 
a condition to setting aside the Judgment. However, Judge Connors later ruled to delete 
attorneys fees altogether, because he deemed them to be appropriate in this case, ruling 
"the Court, in further reviewing Chapter 8a of Title 54 of the Utah Code, finds no 
-1-
provision requiring payment of attorney's fees to the prevailing party, other than in the 
situation where the parties avail themselves of the statute's arbitration provisions, which 
were not an issue in this case. The Court does not find this to be a case where attorney's 
fees should be awarded under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825, because the Court has no 
reason to believe the defendant acted in bad faith." Judge David M. Connors, Ruling and 
Order, March 12, 2010. 
The District Court's own final stance on attorneys fees in this matter should 
ameliorate the attorneys fee condition of DesignScape's otherwise successful request to 
have the judgment [order] set aside below. 
III. A FINAL, APPEALABLE ORDER WAS NOT ENTERED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT AND FILED AND DOCKETED IN THIS CASE 
UNTIL APRIL 9,2010. 
Bonneville mistakenly argues that neither DesignScape's appeal from the district 
court's rulings on either the Rule 60(b) Motion to Vacate Order, or the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction were timely. 
This Court already addressed the Rule 60(b) timeliness argument in the first appeal 
filed in this case, see Bonneville Billing and Collections v. DesignScape, LLC, Case 
Number 20090395-CA. In the Court's Memorandum Decision in that case, it concluded 
that a final, appealable order had not yet been entered below. Furthermore, this Court 
ruled that DesignScape was not prejudiced from being able to bring an appeal from a final 
order below, once it was entered. 
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The final order was not entered below until April, 9, 2010. DesignScape's second 
notice of appeal followed on April 30,2010. Thus, DesignScape's appeal was timely filed 
as to all matters finally disposed of below on April 9, 2010. Accordingly, Bonneville's 
timeliness of appeal argument is hollow and wholly lacking in merit. 
CONCLUSION 
DesignScape's due process rights were violated below when a default order 
[judgment] was entered against DesignScape without the proper procedural rules being 
followed. A timely motion to set aside the judgment brought by DesignScape, and 
effectively denied by the District Court through the imposition of some sort of penalty 
attorneys fees (later determined to be inapplicable by the same court). The District Court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, and without motion by either party, transformed the 
case from a statutory "Blue Stakes" claim to one of negligent damage. 
DesignScape respectfully requests this Court to reverse the District Court's order 
below, and to direct that the case be dismissed, and for such other and further legal and 
equitable relief as this Court may deem just, including awarding DesignScape attorneys 
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 for this case having been brought in bad faith. 
DATED this 7th day of March, 2011. 
Respectfully submitted, 
sarahj. B>6cle 
Sarah J. Beck 
Attorney for DesignScape, LLC 
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ATTACHMENT A 
FINAL ORDER 
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G. SCOTT JENSEN (#4990) 
KEVIN P. SULLIVAN (#3871) of, 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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MLfcU 
APR 0 9 2010 
Layton District Court 
R£C£IV£D 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & COLLECTION, 
a Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
DESIGNSCAPE, LLC. 
Defendants 
ORDER 
Civil No.060603389 
Judge: 
THIS matter came on for trial before the Honorable John Connors, District Court Judge, 
on April 9,2008. The Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel; the Defendant and 
Defendant's counsel were not present The court having found that the Defendant and 
Defendant's counsel were given proper notice and that the Defendant failed to appear. The 
Plaintiffs witnesses were present and able to testify; the Plaintiffs counsel proffered testimony 
to the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises enters the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff is awarded a judgement against the Defendant in the sum of $979.49 plus 
prejudgement interest of 10% per annum from April 13,2005 until entry of the 
Bonneville vs. Designscape 
Civil #060603389 
Order 1 
judgement. 
The Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiffs court costs. 
DATED this ^k day of ( j f / f l / . 201<>-
COURT, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on thecal dayof) fnj)/Q^ . 2010. a copy of the ft oregoingwas 
served in the manner indicated below upon the following: 
Sarah_J. Beck 
Attorney for Defendant 
4189S.EwellDr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Facsimile: 801-649-4749 
C@py 
2i U.S. Mail J£ Facsimile Hand Delivered 
a nk j/mttM 
Bonneville vs. Designscape 
Civil #060603389 
Order 2 
ATTACHMENT B 
RULING AND ORDER* 
BONNEVILLE BILLING AND COLLECTIONS 
v. 
DESIGNSCAPE, LLC 
SECOND DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT 
CASE NUMBER 060603389 
* Requiring Plaintiff [Bonneville] to submit an affidavit and draft and 
submit a form of judgment consistent with the Ruling and Order. 
Mar 19 10 12:46p Sarah J Beck Law Office 8016494749 p.1 
I 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
: DISTRICT, DA/VIS gpjagramjQ 
[, LAYTON D E P A R T M E N T S ^ ^ L S ^ 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & COLLECTION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . I 
DESIGNSCAPE, LLC, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No.: 060603389 
Judge: DAVID M. CONNORS 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Although the factual background of this case is somewhat sparse, it has a long and 
tortured procedural history. A Complaint was initially filed by plaintiff Bonneville 
Billing & Collection on or about May 3, 2006, acting as an assignee on behalf of 
Pacificorp. In the Complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant Designscape, LLC 
negligently damaged an "underground primary when digging at 735 Park Way", resultmg 
in property damages of $979.49. Following nearly two years of attempted mediations 
and pretrial conferences, the matter came on for a bench trial on April 9, 2008. The day 
of trial, however, neither defendant nor its counsel appeared. The Court determined that 
both the defendant and counsel for the defendant had been given proper notice of the trial 
and granted plaintiff's oral motion to strike the answer and enter default against 
defendant. Counsel for plaintiff submitted a form of judgment to Ihe Court awarding (1) 
a judgment: against the Defendant in the sum of $979.49 plus prejudgment interest; and 
(2) a civil penalty of $500.00 pursuant to Utah Code § 54-8(a>l, et scq.* The form of 
judgment also indicated that reasonable attorney's fees and costs would be ^warded. 
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although it set no spccilic amoant of such fees or costs. There being no objection filed as 
to die form of the order, the Court signed the Order on May 20, 2008. 
Defendant filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment l The motion was 
biiefed and a Request to Submit the motion foi [he Court's consideration was filed in 
December 2008. A hearing on the motion was set for January 14, 2009 At the hearing, 
the Court granted the Motion to Set Aside Judgment, conditioned upon defendant paying 
SI 250 00 in attorney's fees.2 Counsel for plaintiff was instructed to draft the form of 
order, and defendant \\<as instructed to make the payment of attorney's fees within ten 
days of entry of die order or the Court would deny the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. 
The proposed form of judgment was mailed to defendant's counsel February 4, 2009. 
Defendant did not object to the form of the proposed order or ask die Court to review or 
reconsider the amount of attorney's fees awarded. The Court signed the judgment 
February 20? 2009 and it was entered on the docket February 26, 2009. Thereafter, 
Defendant failed to pay the conditional attorney's fees and, upon being presented with an 
affidavit confirming that fact, the Court subsequently entered a new order on March 13, 
2009 denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
Defendant attempted to appeal both the Court's May 20, 2008 Order of Default 
Judgment and the March 13,2009 Order Denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment by 
filing a Notice of Appeal on April 24, 2009. The Utah Court of Appeals, after summary 
1
 The Court's docket indicates the Rule 60(b) motion was actually filed on April 29, 2008, several weeks 
before the judgment was entered. However, no Request to Submit was presented to the Court as to the 
motion until December 18,2008, which was after plaintiff initiated supplemental proceedings to aid in 
enforcement of the judgment 
7
 The CouiCb reaboii!* for conditioning the setting aside of the default on the payment of some attorney's 
lees are set forth on the record of the January 14,2009 hearing. In snort, the Court noted, among o:her 
things, the failuie of the defendant and its counsel to appear, the delay in bringing the motion to bel aside 
hefore die court, and die need for plaintiff, tirough counsel, to make multiple court appearances that would 
norttfherwise have^een-required Pbiniiff z seunsci indicted approximately <y hnnrs of time had been 
spent and that counsel's rcgulai liouri} iate was S250/hr. 
2 
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proceedings, issued a Memoiandum Decision on August 27, 2009 dismissing both 
aspects of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. In summary, the Court of Appeals 
held that first, because the May 20? 2008 Order of Default Judgment included a provision 
awarding plaintiffs "reasonable attorney's fees" and not a fixed amount as required foi a 
judgment to be final undei the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendant was not 
appealing a final judgment and the appeal could not be heard. Second, the Court of 
Appeals held that defendant's appeal of the March 13? 2009 denial of its Rule 60(b) 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment was untimely filed and could not be heard. The Court of 
Appeals therefore dismissed the appeal, noting that defendant could still appeal "the 
underlying judgment thai ^ fi^H af^r entry o~"a final, appealable order."4 
Defendant then filed a motion styled as a "Motion to Arrest Entry of Final Order 
or Judgment, and for Dismissal." In this Motion, defendant argues that the cause of 
action asserted by plaintiff was not an assignable cause of action and that, therefore. 
Pacificorp's assignment of its interest in prosecuting this case to plaintiff Bonneville 
Billing was ineffective. Under this theory, defendant argues that Bonneville Billing had 
no standing to sue defendant and that, consequently, the Court had no jurisdiction to hear 
lire ease. Once this motion was fully briefed, the Court set the matter for a hearing, 
which, for various reasons, was not able to be scheduled until January 13, 2010. In the 
interim, a proposed order which was substantially similar to the Court's May 20.2008 
Order of Default Judgment was submitted to and inadvertently signed by a visiting 
rotation judge on December 23,2009. At the January 13,2010 Motion Hearing, both 
3
 See PioVtax Dev. Corp. v. Railc, 2000 UT 4, fl 15,998 P.2d 254 ("LA] (rial court must determine the 
amount of attorney fees awardabie to a party before the judgment becomes final for the pin pases of an 
appeal undct Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3."). 
4
 Bmphasis added 
3 
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parties agreed the December 23,2009 order had been inadvertently signed and stipulated 
that it could be set aside. The Court proceeded to hear argument from both parties 
concerning the Motion to Arrest and to Dismiss. 
After considering those arguments and reviewing the pleadings and exiensive 
procedural history, the Court herein makes its ruling and order denying the Motion to 
Arrest and to Dismiss. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Defendant Designscape challenges the Court's jurisdiction arguing that 
Pacifieorp's claim under the Utah statute is not assignable, that Bonneville Billing never 
had standing as a third party assignee, and that this Court therefore never had jurisdiction 
of the matter. After reviewing pertinent case law, the Court disagrees. Pacificorp's 
underlying negligent property damage claim was assignable to Bonneville Billing. This 
Court has had, and maintains, jurisdiction,5 
While it is true that, generally, tort causes of action are not assignable for the 
purpose of prosecuting the action, exceptions to-the general rule have been .recognizedin 
Utah. For instance, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an action to recover damages 
for negligent destruction of property is assignable: "an action for the negligent killing of 
stock is assignable and that the assignee of such an action may maintain the same 
notwithstanding the assignment was made solely for the purpose of prosecuting the 
' While the claim itself vvas assignable, the cJaim for a statutory "penalty" of $500.00 is probably not 
assignable. See 36 Am. Jar. 2d Forfeitures and Penalties J 56 ("Although a statute may neither expressly 
nor impliedly forbid the assignment of such a right, a right to recover a penalty is generally not assignable." 
(citations omitted)). This point is rendered moot, however, by the fact that the Complaint itself never 
sought the statutory penalty. As noted hereinafter, judgment will not be entered for the penalty. 
4 
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action."6 Other causes of action that are assignable include money overpaid by mutual 
mistake/ conversion,8 and actions to recover stock secured by fraud.9 
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has held that actions for negligent destruction 
of teal property are assignable. In National Union, the plaintiff insurance company 
brought an action against the railroad company for negligent destruction of property on 
behalf of Ms. Minnie Witt11 The insurance company alleged that a fire was negligently 
started by the railroad which subsequently burned down Ms. Witt's "barn, stable, and 
outbuildings" in Heber City.12 The damage cause by the fire was approximately $630.00. 
Ms. Witt had an insurance policy with the plaintiff insurance company and collected 
$250.00 on that policy. Thereafter, she assigned "her claim against the defendant 
(appellant) for damages sustained by reason of the burning of the buildings aforesaid. "]7> 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court staled that M[t]he only test of assignability in this state 
is whether the cause of action survives and passes to the personal representative of a 
decedent."14 The Supreme Court then unhesitatingly declared that this cause of action 
would survive and pass to a personal representative of a decedent if Ms. Will had died in 
the interim. 
Here, as in National Union, plaintiff brought a claim for negligent destruction of 
property, characterized as "damage done to underground primaiy at 753 Park Way" in its 
G
 Wines v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 9 Utah 228, 33 P. 1042 (1893). 
7
 LawJcr v. Jennings, 18 Utah 35, 55 P. 60; 61 (1898). 
8
 Baglin v. Earl-Eagle Min. Co.8 54 Utah 572, 184 P. 190, 193 (1919V 
9
 Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 192, 63 P.2d 6) 1,616 (1936). 
10
 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, 654 (1913); see afro 
Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, f 30. 
11
 Id at 28. 
12
 id 
iSId. 
u
 Id (citing Lawler v. Jennings, 18 Utah 35, 55, 55 P. 60 (1898)). 
15
 Id. 
5 
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complaint. And, although it is distinguishable from National Union in that Pacificorp, 
unlike Ms. Witt, cannot die, Pacificorp is considered a "person" for the purposes of this 
cause of action. Moreover, the pertinent provision of the Utah Code also specifically 
provides that both assignees and personal representatives arc considered "persons*' foi 
purposes of the statute.16 For the above-referenced reasons, Bonneville Rilling & 
Collection is a proper assignee of this cause of action and enjoys standing before this 
Court. 
The Court construes Defendant's Motion to Arrest as a motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction and denies the same. Defendant's moving papers also purport, presumably 
in the alternative, to move the Court for a judgment of dismissal on the pleadings. In 
support, defendant points to alleged deficiencies in the language of the Complaint. 
However, any deficiencies in the original Complaint (filed in 2006) could, and should, 
have been tested early in the case, or through discovery during the course of the case. 
The defendant chose not to do so. It may not raise such issues at this late date. 
Therefore, the Court denies defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as 
untimely and without merit. 
The Court will, however, modify its order of May 20,2008, as follows: 
(a) Paragraph 1 of the order is confirmed, awarding $979.49, plus prejudgment 
interest at the rate of 10% as specified therein; 
(b) Paragraph 2 will be deleted; no civil penalty will be awarded as part of this 
case: 
(c) Paragraph 3 regarding attorney's fees will be deleted;17and 
16
 Chapter 8a of Title 54 of die Utah Code bears the heading of "Damages to Underground Utility 
Facilities". The definition of a "person" for purposes of the chapter is found at UTAH CODE Ann. $ 54-8a-
2(7)(a)(2005). 
*' Although the Complaint and the form-of judgment submitted by plaintiff request fees, and defendant has 
not spscifically focused on this issue, the Court, in further reviewing Chapter 8a of Title 54 of the Utah 
6 
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(d) Paragraph 4, requiring defendant to pay court costs, is confirmed. 
Plaintiff shall submit an affidavit of costs and draft and submit a form of judgment 
consistent with this Ruling and Order. 
DATED this f2 day of March, 2010. 
BY THE COURT 
District Court Judge 
$ <gf CT4TP V£ % 
R O ? O r 12$ 
XT „y$ 
^ > \ V 2 f e T ^ 
Code, finds no provision requiring paymenc of attorney1 & fees to the prevailing party, olhcr than n the 
situation where tfts parties avail themselves of Ihe statutes arbitration provisions, which were not at issue 
in this case. The Court does not find this to be a case %vhere attorney's fees should be awarded under Utah 
Code Ann § 78B-5-825, because the Court has no reason to believe die defendant acted in bad faith. 
7 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certified thai I mailed a copy of the foregoing RULING AND ORDER, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Sarah J. Bock 
4189 South Ewell Drive 
Salt Lake Chy>UT 84107 
G. Scott Jensen 
Kevin P. Sullivan 
PO Box 150612 
Ogden,UT 84415 
SIGNED and DATED this S . day of March, 2010. 
_, , ^ l ^ i O V 
Cferk pTl'he County 
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